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NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION v. EPA: INDUSTRY
BREATHES A SIGH OF RELIEF OVER THE
DETERMINATION OF A SITE'S POTENTIAL
TO EMIT POLLUTANTS UNDER
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Clean Air Act (CAA), considered by many to be the first
modem environmental law, represented Congress's first attempt to
protect this country's air from the growing pollution problems of
the 1960s and early 1970s. 1 Under the CAA, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was empowered to regulate Hazardous
Air Pollutants (HAPs) by setting emission standards at levels which
"provide[d] an ample margin of safety to protect public health."2
1. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 1 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 3385,
3385 (report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works) (citing Clean
Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671) (1990)). President Johnson first signed the Clean Air Act (CAA)
into law in 1963, thereby replacing previous federal air pollution legislation. See id.
Two years later, in hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare stated as follows:
serious air pollution problems aris[e] from the ever-increasing use of motor vehicles, [and] our rising demands for the energy derived from burning of sulfur-bearing fuels ....
The national importance of resolving
these problems is beyond dispute. They are among the most significant
factors in the growing and worsening air pollution problems currently
faced by thousands of American communities ....
Id. The goal of the CAA is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources." Id. at 5.
2. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). Presently, there are hundreds of
different Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) in the air of the United States, and the
quantity of each of these HAPs is no less disturbing. See S. RP. No. 101-228, at
128 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. at 3513. After major manufacturing facilities were required to report their air toxin emissions, the total for the firms
reporting such emissions in 1987 exceeded 2.7 billion pounds per year, which was
estimated to be as little as one-fifth of all emissions at the time. See id.
HAPs may cause cancer and may also be responsible for other health and
environmental problems. See id. In a 1989 EPA study examining the potential
cancer causing effects of exposure to air toxins, EPA estimated that approximately
2700 cancer cases in this country resulted from exposure to 15-40 toxic air pollutants. See id. According to this data, 190,000 Americans (2700 per year x 70 year
life span) could potentially develop cancer from exposure to air toxins. See id.
EPA cautioned that this may be an underestimated figure, because a much larger
number of air pollutants had been identified as potentially toxic. See id.
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The CAA worked poorly.3 For example, although the Act had
set 1975 as the deadline for meeting EPA's primary air quality standards, 4 two years after the deadline, seventy-eight areas still violated
the ozone standards then in place.5 In response to the failure to
meet the goals of the CAA, Congress enacted the 1977 Clean Air
Act Amendments (1977 Amendments) which instituted a new and
more aggressive control program. 6 Nevertheless, "in 1989, over
half of the population of the United States [was] still exposed to
levels of air pollution considered unhealthful by [EPA] and medical
7
researchers."
The CAA also regulated criteria pollutants, so termed because under CAA
sections 108 and 109, EPA must issue criteria identifying the effects of each pollutant. For example, section 108 states that:
[t]he Administrator shall issue air quality criteria for an air pollutant...
[which] shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health
or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in
the ambient air, in varying quantities.
CAA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2); see also id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (providing
rules for national primary and secondary ambient air standards).
3. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 128 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at
3513 (disclosing that in 18 years since the CAA's promulgation, EPA listed just
eight pollutants as hazardous and regulated only some sources of seven of these
pollutants); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-490, at 322 (1990) (recognizing ineffectiveness of CAA during its 18 year existence).
4. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 10 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3396.
The CAA also required states to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) that
would set forth programs for achieving the necessary emissions reductions. See id.
Moreover, CAA section 111 required EPA to establish New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) for new or modified stationary sources. See id. As a means of
enforcing the NSPS, Congress directed the states to include construction permit
programs in their SIPs. See id.
For further discussion of SIPs, see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of construction permit programs, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
5. See id. In 1977, Congress moved back the deadline for meeting the ozone
and CO standards to 1982. Moreover, if sources could show that they could not
meet this deadline, they could obtain an extension which would be effective until
1987. See id. For the definition of an "area source," see infra text accompanying
note 38.
6. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 10-11 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at
3396-97. The 1977 Amendments required states to create new SIPs and to submit
these plans to EPA for approval within two years. See id. at 10. Furthermore, the
1977 Amendments provided that "[a] new source could be constructed in a nonattainment area only if it would operate at the 'lowest achievable emissions rate' and
if emissions reductions could be obtained from other sources to offset the emissions from the proposed source." Id. at 11. Finally, Congress created a new schedule for limiting emissions from new motor vehicles and required areas which were
dangerously below EPA's prescribed emissions levels to institute emission inspection and maintenance programs. See id. at 10-11.
7. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3388-89.
For example, the past President of the American Public Health Association found
that:
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In its continued effort to create more effective air pollution
legislation, Congress promulgated the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 (1990 Amendments)." Congress believed that one of the
primary reasons for the relative failure of the CAA and the 1977
Amendments was EPA's health-based regulation of HAPs.9 Consequently, the 1990 Amendments replaced this approach with a deair pollution is one of the greatest risks to public health in the United
States. Its [sic] causes, contributes to, or aggravates a long list of disease
and dysfunction-chronic bronchitis, lung cancer, nervous disorders and
heart disease. As many as 50,000 premature deaths may be caused by
single air pollutants or a combination of pollutants.
Id. A Harvard researcher also testified that "[i]n every epidemiologic investigation
that we have performed over the past 6 years, we have repeatedly found a 2 to 5
percent air pollution effect on human mortality and morbidity. We find it very
difficult to reject these consistent findings .... " Id. at 2-3, 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at
3388. Finally, the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments noted that "[tihe
American Lung Association, the American Public Health Association and the
American Academy of Pediatrics all testified that we are facing a public health
crisis due to air pollution." Id. at 2, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3388.
There is also evidence that air pollution has a detrimental effect on the
United States economy as well. According to the American Lung Association,
Americans spend $40 billion per year to treat health-related ailments attributable
to air pollution exposure. See id. at 8, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3394. Further, a 1989
University of California study also suggested that a reduction in air pollution in
Southern California would result in almost $10 billion in health care savings each
year. See id.
Moreover, air pollution negatively affects the American agricultural industry.
See id. EPA suggested that common ozone pollution levels can cause severe damage to many types of vegetation, such as reducing tomato yields by 33%, beans by
26%, and wheat by 30%. See id. The World Resources Institute also suggested that
"if ozone levels in agricultural regions were halved ....
U.S. wheat production
would be boosted by $650 million (in 1987 dollars), soybean production by $3.4
billion, corn production by $880 million, and peanut production by $370 million."
Id.
8. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, PUB. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399,
2531-84 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). The goal
of the 1990 Amendments was "to protect, as a national resources [sic], the very air
that all of us rely on for our daily existence." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 4, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3390. Congress stated that based on over ten years of study and
consideration, the 1990 Amendments reflect "the advances in our knowledge of
the health effects, sources and controls of air pollution." Id.
9. See id. at 128. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, CAA section 112 directed
EPA to list those HAPs that it intended to regulate because they might "cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible, illness." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, PUB. L. No. 91604, 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 1954 (84 Stat.) 1676, 1685 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). For such pollutants, EPA was to create emission standards that provided for "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health."
Id. The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments explains that this health-based
standard "[had] been interpreted by many to mean zero exposure to carcinogens,
because any amount of exposure may cause a cancer. EPA [was not] willing to
write standards so stringent because they would shut down major segments of
American industry." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 128 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CAN. at 3513.
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tailed, technology-based regulatory scheme which enabled EPA to
regulate the sources of HAPs themselves, rather than the pollutants
they emitted.10 The new scheme directed EPA to establish stringent emission standards and other requirements for sources of
HAPs based on the amount of pollution each source "emits or has
the potential to emit considering controls."" Unfortunately, Congress neglected to define this important phrase, leaving EPA to do
12
so within the confines of its administrative authority.
The result of this legislative oversight was a protracted and bitter dispute between EPA and a number of major American industries over the definition of the phrase "potential to emit," which the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia finally
resolved in National Mining Association v. EPA.13 In that case, the
D.C. Circuit held that EPA had impermissibly, and in excess of its
authority, defined the phrase "potential to emit" as allowing only
federally enforceable controls to reduce a source's potential to emit
14
pollutants.
10. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 133 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3518.
11. CAA § 112(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1). It is important to note that a
source may be classified as a major source even if its actual emissions do not meet
the major source thresholds. See id. The CAA only requires the facility to have the
potentialto emit an amount of pollution sufficient to meet the source thresholds in
order to be classified as a major source classification. See id.
Under the 1990 Amendments, the new section 112 established an initial list
of 189 HAPs which EPA could periodically revise. See id. § 112(b) (1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b) (1)-(3). Then, EPA was to publish a list of "categories and subcategories" of "major sources" and certain "area sources" that emit these pollutants. See
id. § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c). For each listed "category or subcategory of major sources and area sources" of HAPs, CAA section 112(d) directs EPA to promulgate emission standards. See id. § 112(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1). For further
discussion of "area sources" and "major sources," see infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
12. See Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984) (stating that if statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to specific issue, court must defer to agency's construction unless such construction is
based on impermissible interpretation of statute).
13. 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit also considered whether
EPA properly required the aggregation of all hazardous air emissions within a
plant site, as opposed to considering only those emissions from equipment in similar industrial categories in a major source determination under section 112. See id.
at 1354. For a complete discussion of the aggregation issue, see infra notes 102-07
and accompanying text.
A third issue which the D.C. Circuit considered was whether EPA properly
required the inclusion of "fugitive emissions" in a source's total emissions determination for purposes of source classification. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1354.
For a complete discussion of the fugitive emissions issue, see infra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text.
14. See NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1364.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/6

4

Grolnick: National Mining Association v. EPA: Industry Breathes a Sign of R

1997]

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION

523

This Note focuses on the scope of the CAA's restrictions on
various sources of pollution. Specifically, it concentrates on the applicability of stringent CAA emission standards and other regulations which depend on the determination of a source's potential to
emit pollutants under section 112 of the Act. Part II provides the
background of the "potential to emit" debate through an examination of the debate's genesis, the revised section 112 under the 1990
Amendments, EPA's subsequent rulemaking, and the prior judicial
treatment of the "potential to emit" issue. 15 Part III then presents
the facts of NationalMining.16 Next, Part IV discusses the D.C. Circuit's holding and reasoning in National Mining.17 Subsequently,
Part V critically analyzes the D.C. Circuit's decision.18 Finally, Part
VI assesses the considerable impact that National Mining will have
on both future court decisions and American industry. 19
II.

BACKGROUND

Although the debate between EPA and affected industries over
the proper way to calculate a source's potential to emit pollutants
had existed for over ten years,2 0 the conflict did not fully develop
until the promulgation of both the 1990 Amendments and EPA's
regulations passed pursuant to those amendments. 2 1 While the NationalMiningcase presented the D.C. Circuit with an opportunity to
consider the controversy surrounding a source's "potential to emit,"

it was not the first time this phrase had been subjected to judicial
22
scrutiny.
15. For a discussion of the genesis and prior judicial treatment of the "potential to emit" debate, see infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts of National Mining, see infra notes 87-97 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's holding and reasoning in National
Mining, see infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the D.C. Circuit's decision in NationalMining, see
infra notes 134-152 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of the D.C. Circuit's rejection of EPA's
definition of "potential to emit" on future court decisions and American industry,
see infra notes 153-73 and accompanying text.
20. See NationalMining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating Congress enacted 1990 Amendments "against a backdrop of over a decade of
skirmishing between [EPA] and affected companies").
21. The 1990 Amendments and EPA's subsequent regulations were at the
center of the controversy in National Mining. See NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1351.
For further discussion of the 1990 Amendments, see infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text. For further discussion of EPA's "potential to emit" rules, see infra
notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 1996 WL 393118 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (granting motion for summary vacatur of EPA's "potential to emit" regulation); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir 1995) (vacating EPA
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
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Genesis of the "Potential to Emit" Debate

Congress first called upon EPA to promulgate regulations controlling the calculation of a source's potential to emit pollutants in
the 1977 Amendments. 23 Believing that Congress intended a strict
construction of the phrase "potential to emit," EPA narrowly interpreted this language to exclude even emissions reducing equipment such as scrubbers, filters and other technologies from the list
of acceptable means of reducing a source's potential to emit pollutants.2 4 However, in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,2 5 the D.C. Circuit
rejected this strict interpretation and remanded the regulation to
26
EPA for revision.
In response to Alabama Power, in 1979, EPA proposed a new
definition of "potential to emit" which would have taken into account air pollution control equipment, but not operational restraints.2 7 EPA took a slightly broader approach in the final
regulations promulgated in 1980, determining that operational restraints could be included in the emission calculations as well, but
only if they were "federally enforceable." 28 EPA justified this new
requirement as "necessary, as a practical matter, to ensure that
regulations challenged in NationalMining); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting early EPA interpretation of phrase "potential
to emit" as excluding from calculation emissions reducing equipment such as
scrubbers, filters, and other technologies); Ogden Projects v. New Morgan Landfill, 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (reversing holding on motion for consideration in light of National Mining and Chemical).
23. The phrase, "emit, or [has] the potential to emit" originated in the Senate
version of the bill that was to become the 1977 Amendments. See S. REP. No. 94717, at 221 (1976); S. REP. No. 95-127, at 219 (1977). The House version used the
equivalent phrase, "directly emits, or has the design capacity to emit." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1175, at 358 (1976), H.R. REP. No. 95-194, at 438 (1977). Although the
conference committee ultimately adopted the wording of the Senate bill, its report
illustrates the committee's equivalent interpretation of the House and Senate versions on the "potential to emit" issue. In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit noted the
committee's incorporation of the House's language in its report. See Alabama
Power,636 F.2d at 355 ("The State plan must require permits for: (a) All 28 categories listed in the Senate bill if the source has the potential (design capacity) to emit
over 100 tons per year .... .") (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-564, at 152 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1533)).
24. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(b) (3),
52.21(b) (3) (1978) (excluding artificial means of emission reduction from potential to emit determination).
25. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir 1979).
26. See id. at 355. In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit found that EPA erred in
defining "potential to emit" as excluding the beneficial effect of air pollution control equipment designed in a facility. See id. at 352. For further discussion of the
Alabama Power decision, see infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
27. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51,924 (1979).
28. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,746 (1980). This rule was the first version to
include the federal enforceability requirement. According to the regulation, emis-
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sources will perform the proper operation and maintenance for the
control equipment."29
The D.C. Circuit considered a subsequent challenge to the federal enforceability requirement of the 1980 rule which was ultimately settled in February 1982 after EPA agreed to amend its
position.3 0 The proposed settlement regulation would have considered emission limitations that were "enforceable under federal,
state or local law and discoverable by the Administrator and any
other person" in calculating a source's potential to emit pollutants5 1 Interestingly, in 1989, by the time EPA promulgated the
final rule pursuant to the settlement agreement, it "abandon[ed]
the terms of the settlement... [and] reverted to its former position
of requiring federal enforceability as the sine qua non for crediting
operational restraints."3 2 As a result, new litigation followed in the
D.C. Circuit; however, the court stayed those actions in anticipation
33
of the 1990 Amendments.
B.

Section 112 Under the 1990 Amendments

The 1990 Amendments fundamentally revised CAA section
112, which regulates the emission of HAPs.M4 Under the new
scheme, Congress established a list of 189 HAPs for EPA regulasion restrictions were "federally enforceable" if they were "enforceable by the Administrator." Id. at 52,737.
29. Id. at 52,688.
30. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362. Those challenges were consolidated
with related petitions as Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 79-1112 et al. (D.C. Cir.
1980). Final Joint Brief of Petitioners Chemical Manufacturers Association and
American Petroleum Institute, at 10 n.7, NationalMining (No. 95-1006). The D.C.
Circuit refers to this action without citation, and because the challenge eventually
reached settlement it remained unreported.
31. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 48 Fed. Reg.
38,742, 38,748, 38,755 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
32. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362-63. The final rule still defined "federal
enforceability" as "enforceable by the Administrator," but had been expanded in
scope by interpretation to include state constraints approved under federally approved plans called "State Implementation Plans." Requirements for Preparation,
Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,285-86 (1989) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51-52). For further discussion of SIPs and their role as an emission
reducing control, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
33. See NationalMining,59 F.3d at 1363. The D.C. Circuit ultimately decided
these challenges in the consolidated action, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 891514, 89-1515, 89-1516, 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For a further discussion
of the Chemical decision, see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
34. S. R P. No. 101-228, at 133 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 3385,
3518; see also NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1353 (recognizing 1990 Amendments revised section 112 in comprehensive overhaul).
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tion.35 The EPA was then to publish a list of "major sources" and
certain "area sources" that emitted these pollutants.3 6 Congress defined a "major source" of hazardous pollutants as the following:
any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit consideringcontrols,

in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any combi37
nation of hazardous pollutants.

An "area source" under the CAA is "any stationary source of hazardous air pollutants that is not a major source."38 Finally, for each of
these major and area sources, section 112(d) directs EPA to pro39
mulgate emission standards.
35. See CAA § 112(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)-(3).
36. See id. § 112(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1). Section 112(c)(1) states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
the Administrator shall publish, and shall from time to time, but no less
often than every 8 years, revise, if appropriate, in response to public comment or new information, a list of all categories and subcategories of
major sources and area sources (listed under paragraph (3)) of the air
pollutants listed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
Id. Further, "the Administrator shall list under this subsection each category or
subcategory of area sources which the Administrator finds presents a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment (by such sources individually or
in the aggregate) warranting regulation under this section." Id. § 112(c)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 7412(c) (3).
37. Id. § 112(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (emphasis added). The CAA defines a "stationary source" as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant." Id. § 111(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (3).
38. Id. § 112(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a) (2).
39. See id. § 112(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1). This section specifically states
that "[t]he administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing emission standards for each category or subcategory of major sources and area sources of hazardous air pollutants listed for regulation pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section." Id. These emissions standards represent a significant innovation in the
regulatory measures imposed upon sources of HAPs. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at
133 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3518 (describing new technologybased standards for regulating sources of HAPs under 1990 Amendments). Under
the 1990 Amendments, Congress requires major sources to attain the maximum
degree of reduction in emissions that EPA deems achievable, often referred to as
"maximum achievable control technology," or MACT standards. See CAA
§ 112(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2). Congress directed EPA to develop such standards "taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction,
and any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements .... " Id.
For new sources, the maximum achievable reduction in emissions must be at
least as stringent as the emission control achieved in practice by the best-controlled similar source. See id. § 112(d) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3). For existing
sources in a category of 30 or more, the maximum achievable reduction in emissions must be at least as stringent as the average emission limitation achieved by
the 12 best performing sources in that category. See id.
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Because major sources are potentially subject to stricter regulatory control under the CAA than area sources, facility owners such
as those represented by the petitioners in NationalMining generally
attempt to avoid a "major source" classification.4° For example,
"Maximum Achievable Control Technology" (MACT) emission
standards are only applicable to major sources.4 1 In addition, a major source may not be modified, constructed or reconstructed
under Title V of the CAA, unless it can be shown that the source
will continue to meet the MACT standards. 42 Further, a major
source cannot obtain the requisite Title V operating permit unless
it complies with extensive monitoring, reporting and record-keep43
ing requirements.
The CAA does not necessarily impose such stringent regulations on area sources. 4" Retaining the CAA's health-based standard
prior to the 1990 Amendments, Congress directed EPA to list only
those area sources for regulation that "present[] a threat of adverse
effects to human health or the environment ... ."45 In addition,
Congress allows EPA to choose whether to establish emission standards for listed area sources, using only "generally available control
40. See NationalMining, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
41. See CAA § 112(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(2). For further discussion of
MACT emission standards, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
42. See CAA§ 112(g) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g) (2). Section l12(g) (2) provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) After the effective date of a permit program under subchapter V of
this chapter in any State, no person may modify a major source of hazardous air pollutants in such State, unless the Administrator (or the State)
determines that the maximum achievable control technology emission
limitation under this section for existing sources will be met....
(B) After the effective date of a permit program under subchapter V of
this chapter by any State, no person may construct or reconstruct any
major source of hazardous air pollutants, unless the Administrator (or
the State) determines that the maximum achievable control technology
emission limitation under this section for new sources will be met....
Id.
43. See id. §§ 501-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-61f. A Title V operating permit generally requires that "[e]ach permit issued under this subchapter shall set forth inspection, entry, monitoring, compliance certification, and reporting requirements
to assure compliance with the permit terms and conditions." Id. § 504(c), 42
U.S.C. § 7661c(c). More specifically, the permit should include the following:
enforceable emission limitations and standards, a schedule of compliance, a requirement that the permittee submit to the permitting authority, no less often than every 6 months, the results of any required
monitoring, and such other conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with applicable requirements of this subchapter, including the requirements of the applicable implementation plan.
Id. § 502, 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (a).
44. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1353.
45. CAA § 112(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (3).
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technologies or management practices," as opposed to the MACT
standards required for major sources.46 Finally, neither the Title V
permitting requirements nor the restrictions on modification, con47
struction and reconstruction are applicable to area sources.
C.

The "Potential to Emit" Regulation

Under the 1990 Amendments, Congress directed EPA to promulgate emission standards for both major and area sources of
HAPs.4 8 In August 1993, in order to "eliminate the need to repeat
general information and requirements within each [emission] standard," EPA proposed a general rule codifying the "procedures and
criteria needed to implement" emission standards for sources of
HAPs. 49 On March 16, 1994, EPA promulgated a final rule adopting these General Provisions which was the subject of the dispute in
50

National Mining.

EPA's final rule defined "major source" in terms nearly identical to those in section 112(a)(1) of the CAA.5 1 In addition, EPA
46. See id. § 112(d) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (5) (describing alternate standards for area sources). These standards can be less stringent than the MACT
standards required for major sources under section 7412(d) (2). See S. REP. No.
101-228, at 172 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 3385, 3557.
47. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1354 (citing CAA §§ 501-07, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7661-610. For further discussion of the Title V permitting requirements see
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. See CAA § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1). In relevant part, this section states that "It]he Administrator shall promulgate regulations establishing
emission standards for each category or subcategory of major sources and area
sources of hazardous air pollutants listed for regulation .... " Id.
49. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: General Provisions, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,760 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 60, 61, and 63.). The General Provisions are essentially default provisions that
are binding and attach to each source category standard. See 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408
(1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 63.2). However, if so explicitly provided in the EPA
regulations, any specific standard may override the General Provisions in whole or
in part. See id.
With regard to the phrase, "potential to emit," consistent with the approach
embodied in its regulations since 1980, EPA proposed to allow consideration of
federally enforceable emission reducing controls, including physical and operational limits, in the calculation of "major source" thresholds. See National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: General Provisions,
58 Fed. Reg. at 42,786.
50. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Categories: General Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R.

§ 63.2).
51. "Major source" was defined as the following:
any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to
emit consideringcontrols, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any
hazardous air pollutant, or 25 tons per year or more of any combination
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defined a source's "potential to emit" as its "maximum capacity...5 2

to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational design."
Importantly, the EPA rule also allowed a source to reduce its potential to emit pollutants through the use of physical and/or operational controls, but only if these controls are "federally
53
enforceable."
Shortly after the final rule's promulgation, EPA released a
memorandum to clarify what constitutes a "federally enforceable"
constraint on a source's potential to emit.5 4 In fact, EPA's primary
reason for issuing this memorandum was that it recognized the
complexity of the federal enforceability requirement, and the difficulty of identifying controls that meet this requirement. 5 5 The
memorandum identified a number of mechanisms through which
state and local agencies can create federally enforceable constraints
56
upon a source's potential to emit.

of hazardous air pollutants, unless the Administrator establishes a lesser
quantity ....
Id. at 12,433-34 (emphasis added). Moreover, under the rule an "area source [is]
any stationary source ... that is not a major source." Id. A "stationary source" is
"any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant." Id.
52. Id. at 12,434.
53. See id. (emphasis added). In relevant part, the rule provides that:
[a] ny physical or operational limitation on the capacity of the stationary
source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount or material
combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if
the limitation or the effect it would have on emissions is federally
enforceable.
Id. (emphasis added). A control is "federally enforceable" if it is "enforceable by
the Administrator and citizens under the Act or... under other statutes administered by the Administrator." Id. at 12,433.
54. SeeJOHN S. SEITZ, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF AIR QuALrrY PLANNING AND
STANDARDS, TO Am DIvISION DIRECTORS, U.S. EPA, REGIONS I-X, OPTIONS FOR LimITING THE POTENTIAL TO EMr (PTE) OF A STATIONARY SOURCE UNDER SECTION 112
AND Trru V OF THE CLEAN Am ACT (1995) [hereinafter OPTIONS FOR LIMITING THE

PTE].
55. See id. at 2 (noting "there appears to be some confusion and questions
regarding how potential to emit limits may be established").
According to EPA, "[flederal enforceability is an essential element of establishing limitations on a source's potential to emit." Id. at 2. This requirement
assures that major sources will comply with the restrictions imposed by the CAA,
because it authorizes both EPA and citizens, in addition to state and local agencies
(whose programs have been approved by EPA) to enforce the restrictions/regulations applicable to the source. See id. In addition, EPA suggested that federal enforceability assures source owners and operators that emission limitations which
they have adopted from approved state or local agencies will be recognized by
EPA. See id.
56. See id. at 3. As an initial matter, EPA explained that to qualify as "federally enforceable," controls must not only be effective as a practical matter, but must
also be integrated into the SIP. SeeJohn M. Rawicz, Options Available to Reduce the
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Potentialto Emit of a Stationary Source Under Section 112 and Title V of the Clean Air Ac
2 ErvrL. L. 537, 546 (1996). To be practically enforceable, a particular constraint
or condition must possess adequate testing, monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting requirements. See id; see also Memorandum from John Rasnic, Policy Determination on Limiting Potential to Emit for Koch Refining Company's Clean
Fuels Project (March 13, 1992) (same).
In order for state regulations to be deemed federally enforceable, each state
must create an implementation plan to enforce the substantive restrictions under
the CAA and submit this plan to the Administrator of the EPA for approval. See
CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). Once included within the SIP, a state control
becomes enforceable not only by the state which is the primary regulating authority, but also by the EPA Administrator. See id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. In addition,
under certain circumstances private citizens may bring a suit for noncompliance
with the now federalized pollution control programs. See id. § 304, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604.
One method of achieving federal enforceability for state and local regulations
is to attain EPA approval of a state's own operating permit program, thus creating
a "federally enforceable state operating permit program," (FESOPP). See Options
for Limiting the PTE, supra note 54, at 3. This case-by-case permitting program is
most applicable to complex sources with numerous and varying emission points,
and is often accomplished through a non-title V federally enforceable state operating permit program. See id.; see also EPA Memorandum, Approaches to Creating
Federally-Enforceable Emissions Limits (November 3, 1993) (same).
Another type of case-by-case permit is a construction permit. See Rawicz, supra,
at 552; see also Letter from John S. Seitz, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standard, to Mr. Jason Grumet, Executive Director for Coordinated Air Use
Management (November 2, 1994) [hereinafter Seitz Letter]. These New Source
Review (NSR) construction permits generally cover new and modified sources, and
are often developed by states as part of their SIPs. See Options for Limiting the
PTE, supra note 54, at 4. EPA does not permit an NSR permit program to qualify
as a federally enforceable control on a source's potential to emit, however, unless
the program is sufficiently broad in scope. See Rawicz, supra, at 553. For example,
an NSR program which defines "modification" of a source to include both physical
and operational changes would qualify as a federally enforceable control. See id.
In this way, a source which voluntarily reduces its hours of operation would constitute a "modified" facility under such an NSR program. See id.
A third means of attaining federal enforceability is through general restrictions on many sources within a single category, known as "prohibitory" or "exclusionary" rules, which may be included in a SIP. See OPTIONS FOR LIMrTNG THE PTE,
supra note 54, at 4. In order to be a valid constraint on a source's potential to emit,
an exclusionary rule must be practicably enforceable, adopted with adequate opportunity for public comment, and incorporated into the SIP. See id.; see, e.g.,
Rawicz, supra, at 552.
Similar to exclusionary rules, a fourth procedure for creating federally enforceable restrictions is through general permit programs, which establish valid
constraints for particular types of sources in a one time procedure. See Options for
Limiting the PTE, supra note 54, at 4. The advantage of general permits over exclusionary rules is that after EPA approves a general permit program, additional
sources within the same category can receive permits without requiring a formal
revision of the SIP. See Rawicz, supra, at 552. Though generally considered part of
a Title V permit program, state and local agencies can also submit a general permit
program as part of its SIP. See Options for Limiting the PTE, supra note 54, at 4.
Moreover, general permits included within a SIP-approved FESOPP can also create
potential to emit limits for groups of sources. See id.
Finally, Title V operating permit programs may also create federally enforceable constraints on a source's potential to emit. See id. at 5. This type of control is
rather limited, however, because the deadline for states to submit their programs
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Judicial Treatment of the "Potential to Emit" Regulation

Although the debate surrounding the determination of a
57
source's potential to emit has received limited judicial attention,
the federal courts that have addressed the issue have consistently
ruled in favor of broadly construing the acceptable means of reducing a source's potential to emit pollutants. 58 In 1979, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia first
considered EPA's potential to emit regulation in Akabama Power Co.
v. Costle.59 In that case, the Alabama Power Company petitioned for
review of EPA's "potential to emit" definition in the 1978 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations, which allegedly
ignored the effects of pollution control equipment in determining
a source's potential to emit.6° Holding for the power company, the
court rejected EPA's strict construction of the acceptable means of
for inclusion under Title V was November 15, 1995. See Rawicz, supra, at 553. Because all sources must obtain a Tide V permit if their emissions exceed the major
source level, Title V permits act as a federally enforceable deterrent on a source's
potential to emit pollutants. See Options for Limiting the ITE, supra note 54, at 5;
Rawicz, supra, at 554 (same).
57. Few courts have addressed this issue because the CAA grants exclusive
jurisdiction for judicial review to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See CAA § 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (providing that
"[a] petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any...
standard or requirement under section 7412 of this tide ... may be filed only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.").
58. See generally Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, No. 96-1224, 1996
WL 393118 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (granting Petitioners' motion for summary vacatur of
federal enforceability requirement challenged in NationalMining); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637, 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (vacating federal enforceability requirement challenged in National Mining); Alabama Power Co. v
Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting strict EPA limitations on emission
reducing controls); Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Co., 911 F. Supp.
863 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (calculating defendant source's potential to emit pollutants
based on reasoning in NationalMining).
59. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court handed down a voluminous
three-part opinion due to the number of issues raised in the case. See id. at 345.
Judge Leventhal's opinion addresses the "potential to emit" issue. See id.
60. See id. at 353. EPA's definition of "potential to emit," excluded even emission-reducing pollution control equipment such as scrubbers, filters, and other
technologies. See id. at 323.
The PSD regulations apply to "major emitting facilit[ies]" which are defined
in CAA section 169(1) as the following:
any of the following stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or have
the potentialto emi one hundred [tons per year] or more of any air pollutant from the following [list of 28 source categories]. Such term also includes any other source with the potential to emit two hundred and fifty
[tons per year] or more of any air pollutant ....
CAA § 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (emphasis added). Like section 112, section
169(1) also classified an emitting facility as a "major emitting facility" if the source
emitted or had the potential to emit the threshold level of pollutants when operating at full design capacity. See id.
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reducing a source's potential to emit.6 1 Looking first to the language of CAA section 169, the D.C. Circuit found that because the
verb "emit" referred to a source's actual emissions, EPA's interpretation of "potential to emit" caused the verb to lose all significance,
62
because potential emissions would always exceed actual emissions.
With respect to congressional intent, the court reasoned that
when drafting the CAA, "Congress [had been] fully aware that
many major new sources of air pollution were already required by
law to install and operate air pollution control equipment." 63 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit stated that it would require "strong statutory evidence" for EPA to establish that Congress intended to
ignore the operation of control equipment required by existing
law.6 4 The D.C. Circuit found no such evidence.6
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit surmised that Congress intended to
reach "large industrial enterprises-major actual emitters of air pollution" rather than small facilities that might actually or potentially
emit pollutants below the threshold level.6 The D.C. Circuit
pointed out that if EPA were to employ its interpretation and not
61. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 355. The court characterized EPA's interpretation of the phrase "potential to emit" as "referring to the measure of a
source's 'uncontrolled emissions' i.e., the projected emissions of a source when
operating at full capacity, with the projection increased by hypothesizing the absence of air pollution control equipment designed into the source." Id. at 353 (emphasis added) (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(b) (3), 52.21(b)(3) (1978)).
62. See id. at 353. According to the court, EPA's calculation of "potential to
emit" assumed that a source operates at full capacity and without any pollution
control technology. See id. In reality, sources do not operate under these conditions. See id. Thus, potential emissions will always exceed actual emissions under
EPA's rule. See id. at 353. Consequently, EPA's interpretation failed to give effect
to the disjunctive "or" in the definition of "potential to emit." See id.
63. Id. at 353. The sources of these requirements were the "new source performance standards" of CAA section 111, as well as provisions of existing state implementation plans. See id.
64. See id. at 353-54.
65. See id. at 354 (stating "[a]ll the statutory evidence points the other way");
see also Rawicz, supra note 56, at 540 (reporting "[t]he court found no statutory
authority that required EPA to calculate the 'potential to emit' without considering the air pollution control equipment that the CAA required to be designed into
the facility.").
66. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 354. The court based this finding on the
100 ton per year threshold of section 169(1), which extends coverage to 28 categories of facilities. See id. The D.C. Circuit also found that the legislative history of
the CAA demonstrated Congress's understanding that some industrial sources
would be too small to satisfy the major source tonnage thresholds set forth in section 169(1). See id.; see e.g., H.R REP. No. 95-564, at 152 (1977), U.S.C.C.A.N.,
1077, 1533; S. REP. No. 95-127, at 96-97; S. REP. No. 94-717, at 23; 123 CONG. Rxc.
S9255 (daily ed. June 9, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Domenici); 123 CONG. Rrc. S9169
(daily ed. June 8, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); 123 CONG. REc. S12809 (daily
ed. July 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. McClure).
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consider the effects of air pollution control equipment, every facility in the listed categories would have the potential to emit above
the threshold level. 67 Finally, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that Congress, aware of the high rate of effectiveness of pollution control
equipment, 68 must have intended for such control measures to be
included in the "potential to emit" calculation so as to avoid the
classification of obviously minor sources as major sources of hazardous pollutants. 69 Therefore, after considering both the relevant
statutory language and legislative history, the D.C. Circuit rejected
EPA's 1978 regulation defining "potential to emit" as excluding pollution control equipment from a source's emission
determination.

70

Less than two months after the court handed down the National Mining decision, the D.C. Circuit again considered a challenge to EPA's definition of the phrase "potential to emit" in
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA.71 In this consolidated action,
the petitioners challenged EPA's "potential to emit" definition as
set forth in regulations involving its New Source Review (NSR) program. 72 Like the Final General Provisions rule challenged in National Mining, the NSR imposed a federal enforceability prerequisite
on the controls that may be considered in reducing a source's po-

67. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 354.
68. See id. The court noted that at the time of the enactment of the PSD
provisions, technology was available that could reduce the particulate matter from
emissions by over 99%. See id. Thus, a major source under EPA's regulations with
the potential to emit 100 tons per year of particulate matter would actually emit
less than one ton per year using such emission control technology. See id.
69. See id. The D.C. Circuit pointed out that the heating apparatus used in a
large high school or in a small community college would become a "major" source
under EPA's strict interpretation of the statute. See id. (citing CoNG. REc. 512,812
(daily ed. July 19, 1976)).
70. See id. at 355. In so doing, the court also rejected EPA's argument that a
contrary interpretation of "potential to emit" creates a conflict between sections
169(1) and 165(b) of the CAA. See id. Rather, the court stated that the asserted
conflict was based on an erroneous interpretation of the application of CAA section 165(b). See id. at 354. In addition, while the court conceded that the legislative history provides some support for EPA's position, the committee reports and
floor debates reflect a congressional intent inconsistent with EPA's "uncontrolled
emissions" approach. See id. at 355.
71. 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The disposition of this case remains
unpublished pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(b). See id. at *1. The decision of the
D.C. Circuit is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
which appears in the Federal Reporter at 70 F.3d 637. See id.
72. See Final Joint Brief of Petitioners Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n and
American Petroleum Institute at 1; Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 1995 WL 650098
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 89-1514).
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tential to emit pollutants under the CAA. 7 3 In a one-page opinion,
the D.C. Circuit stated that it had decided a similar challenge in
National Mining, vacated the regulations, and remanded the case
"to [EPA] for reconsideration in light of National Mining
74
Association."
Shortly after the Chemical decision, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became the first federal district court to follow the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in
Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Co. 75 The plaintiff sought
(1) a declaratory judgment against the defendant; (2) an order enjoining further operation of the landfill until the defendant obtained the proper CAA permit; and (3) damages and costs as a
result of the defendant's violations. 76 The district court held that
73. See Final Joint Brief at *1, Chemical (No. 89-1514). See also 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.24(h) (12) (1996). According to section 52.24 of the C.F.R.:
Federally enforceable means all limitations and conditions which are enforceable by the Administrator, including those requirements developed
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. parts 60 and 61, requirements within any applicable
State implementation plan, any permit requirements established pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 52.21 or under regulations approved pursuant to 40
C.F.R. part 51, subpart I, including operating permits issued under an
EPA-approved program that is incorporated into the State implementation plan and expressly requires adherence to any permit issued under
such program.
40 C.F.R. § 52.24(h) (12). For further discussion of EPA's regulation setting out
its definition of "potential to emit," see supranotes 48-72, 74-86 and accompanying
text.
74. Chemical 1995 WL 650098, at *1. Interestingly, nine months later, Chemical Manufacturers Association was again a party to a separate challenge to EPA's
regulations defining "potential to emit" as including a federal enforceability prerequisite. See Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, No. 96-1224, 1996 WL
393118, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (granting Petitioners' motion for summary vacatur
and remand in light of both NationalMining and Chemical) (Rogers, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
75. 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Proceeding under CAA section 304, the
citizen suit provision of the CAA, the plaintiff, a competing resource recovery facility, alleged that the defendant constructed and continued to operate a solid waste
landfill without the permit required by Part D of Title I of the CAA. See Ogden, 911
F. Supp. at 866. Section 304 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
a)Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new
or modified major emitting facility without a permit required under part
C of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to significant deterioration of
air quality) or part D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the
alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of any condition
of such permit.
Id. § 7604(a) (3), CAA § 304 (1994).
76. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 866.
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the defendant's landfill did not violate the preconstruction permit
requirement for major sources under Part D of the CAA, 77 because
its potential to emit pollutants did not meet the major source
thresholds when calculated using non-federally enforceable
78
controls.
77. See id. at 874. Part D of Title I of the CAA requires a preconstruction
review and permit for all proposed stationary sources in certain areas that qualify
as "major sources" of pollutants. See id. at 874 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(f) (1994);
40 C.F.R. § 165(a) (1) (iv) (B) (1994)).
The EPA has set forth a number of preconstruction permitting requirements
in order to satisfy Part D. See id. (citing 40 C.F.1R § 51.165 (1994), 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.24 (1994), and 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, Appendix S (1994)). These requirements
include that major source applicants:
(a) obtain sufficient "offsetting emissions reductions" from existing air
pollution sources in the proposed projects geographical area;
(b) demonstrate that the offsetting emissions reductions procured ensure
that the nonattainment area make progress toward complying with the
applicable NAAQS and provide a net air quality benefit to the area; and
(c) install air pollution control equipment to comply with the Lowest
Achievable Emission Rate Standard.
Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 874-75 n.17 (quoting CAA § 173(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7503(a) (1) (A); 40 C.F.1. §§ 51.165(a) (2), (a) (3) (ii) (F) (1994))). For purposes
of Part D, section 7511c(b) (2) defines a "major source" as "any stationary source
that emits or has the potential to emit at least 50 tons per year of volatile organic
compounds," or VOCs. See id. at 875 n.18 (quoting CAA § 184(b) (2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7511c(b) (2)). In relevant part, CAA section 184(b) (2) states:
[a] ny stationary source that emits or has the potential to emit at least 50
tons per year of volatile organic compounds shall be considered a major
stationary source and be subject to the requirements which would be applicable to major stationary sources if the area were classified as a Moderate nonattainment area [among which is the requirement to obtain a Part
D permit per CAA §§ 181 (a) (2) (C) (I) and 182(b)].
CAA § 184(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(b)(2). Further, for Part D permitting purposes, EPA defined "potential to emit" as including a federal enforceability prerequisite on its emissions limitations. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 872 (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.165 (a) (1) (iii) (1994)). In relevant part, EPA defined "potential to emit" to
mean:
the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its
physical and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation
on the capacity of the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution
control equipment and restrictions on hours of operation or on the type
or amount of material combusted, stored or processed, shall be treated as
part of its design only if the limitation or the effect it would have on
emissions is federally enforceable.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 40 C.F.R. § 51.165 (a) (1) (iii) (1994).
78. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 876. The district court's decision was made
after the defendant made a motion for reconsideration of the case in light of the
D.C. Circuit's holding in Chemical. See id. at 865. The district court explained that
its prior decision finding the defendant landfill violated the CAA was based largely
on EPA's definition of the term "potential to emit," which the D.C. Circuit had
vacated just six days prior to its own ruling. See id. at 872. Thus, the court stated
that "[a]fter assessing [Chemicals] impact, we now find Defendant not in violation
of the Clean Air Act," because the defendant's gas management system acceptably
reduced the landfill's potential to emit pollutants below the major source thresholds. See id. at 865.
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First, the district court found that the necessary data existed at
the time of the site's construction7 9 to determine that the gas management system would effectively reduce the landfill's emissions below the major source threshold. 80 Coupling the site's 99%
destruction efficiency with a 100% gas collection rate, the district
court determined that the landfill would produce non-fugitive emissions of at most 6.7 tons per year-a figure well below the 50 tons
per year threshold.8 1 Therefore, the district court held that the defendant's gas management system was an effective form of pollution
control equipment. 82
Next, the district court ruled that the defendant's gas management system also satisfied the requirement set forth in NationalMining that the emission controls stem from local, state or federal
government regulations, because the defendant had in fact received a construction and operation permit from the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection. 83 Accordingly, the court
found that this permit "constitute[d] a regulation required by state
law that force [d] Defendant to limit its ... emissions to below 50
tons per year." 84 The district court thus concluded that the defendant did not violate the permit requirement under Part D of the
CAA, because its landfill's potential to emit, when calculated using
state controls, did not rise to the level of a major source. 8 5 There79. See id. at 876 (concluding that defendant met standard set forth in National Mining). The plaintiff disputed this finding, arguing unsuccessfully that
under an ex ante evaluation of the gas management system, there was no basis from
which to conclude that this control system would be "unquestionably" and "demonstrably" effective in limiting emissions to below 50 tons per year. See id.
80. See id. at 877. The court determined that both parties had apparently
assumed that the landfill had the ability to capture 100% of the gas it generated in
calculating its non-fugitive emissions. See id. In addition, the court noted that in
its Solid Waste Permit Application, the defendant guaranteed" that the gas management system would on average destroy over 99% of the fugitive emissions collected. See id.
81. See id. at 876. In a separate part of the opinion, the court ruled that only
non-fugitive emissions may be counted in determining whether a source meets the
50 tons per year threshold, because EPA had not satisfied the rulemaking requirement under CAA section 302j). See id. at 878.
82. See id. at 877.
83. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 877. Among this permit's conditions was a requirement that an applicant demonstrate that its site's emissions would fall below
the major source threshold, a fact which the defendant sufficiently proved. See id.
This permit incorporated the standards set forth in the CAA as part of Pennsylvania's SIP. See id. For a further discussion of SIPs, see supra notes 62-71 and
accompanying text.
84. Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 878.
85. See id. at 876. In so holding, the district court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Chemicaldecision actually created two separate standards
for evaluating a source's potential to emit pollutants, because National Mining only

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/6

18

19971

Grolnick: National Mining Association v. EPA: Industry Breathes a Sign of R
NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION

fore, the federal courts that have considered challenges to EPA's
definition of "potential to emit" are in accordance with National
Mining in broadly construing the acceptable controls for determining a source's potential to emit pollutants.86
III.

FACTS

National Mining presented the D.C. Circuit with an opportunity
to again consider the debate surrounding the calculation of a
source's potential to emit pollutants. 8 7 General Electric Company
and four trade associations,8 8 representing various American industries, filed a petition for review of an EPA order implementing the
1990 Amendments to CAA section 112.89 Petitioners challenged
three aspects of the EPA order. 90
First, National Mining Association (NMA), American Forest
and Paper Association (AFPA) and General Electric disputed EPA's
requirement to aggregate all hazardous air emissions within a plant
site to determine whether that site is a major source under section
112. 91 Next, NMA challenged EPA's requirement of the inclusion
addressed operational restrictions on a source's potential to emit, while Alabama
Power would govern physical restrictions. See id. at 875. The court rejected this
position, stating that National Mining made clear that "the court was dealing with
both types of pollution controls." See id. Moreover, in NationalMining, "the court
focused on an EPA definition identical to the one at issue in the instant case." Id.
In addition, the district court maintained that if the D.C. Circuit intended to limit
its decision only to operational restriction, "it would have said so explicitly." Id. at
875-76.
86. For a discussion of federal courts that have broadly construed the acceptable controls for determining a source's potential to emit pollutants, see supranotes
57-86 and accompanying text.
87. See also National Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
88. The four petitioning trade associations were (1) Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA), representing companies that manufacture industrial chemicals; (2) American Petroleum Institute (API), representing companies engaged in
the petroleum industry; (3) National Mining Association (NMA), representing
companies that produce metal, coal and minerals, and that manufacture mining
equipment; and (4) American Forest and Paper Association (AFPA), representing
companies that make pulp, paper, paperboard and solid wood. See id. at 1352.
89. See id. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had original jurisdiction over
this action pursuant to CAA section 307(b), which states that "[a] petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating... any emission standard or
requirement under section 7412 of this title... may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." CAA § 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (1994).
90. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: General Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.RL
pts. 60, 61, and 63).
91. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1354-55. The court referred collectively to
NMA and AFPA as NMA for purposes of this issue. See id. at 1354. General Electric
argued that EPA may require aggregation of emissions from sources only if those
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of "fugitive emissions" in a source's aggregate emissions in a major
source determination. 92 Finally, and most importantly, Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA) and American Petroleum Institute (API) contended that EPA overstepped its regulatory authority
by permitting a source to reduce its "potential to emit" only with
"federally enforceable" emission controls, thereby unreasonably excluding equally effective state and local means of emission
93
reduction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia first held that EPA reasonably interpreted the CAA as requiring
the aggregation of all hazardous air emissions within a plant site in
determining whether a site was a major source. 94 Next, the D.C.
Circuit found that EPA also reasonably required the inclusion of
fugitive emissions in a site's hazardous air emissions for purposes of
determining whether that site was a major source. 95 Finally, the
D.C. Circuit held that EPA had in fact exceeded its authority by
considering only federally enforceable emission controls in determining a plant site's potential to emit pollutants. 96 Therefore, the
sources fell within the same source category. See id. at 1355. NMA claimed that
EPA may combine emissions only if the emitting facilities fall within the same twodigit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. See id. SIC codes refer to "the
nomenclature used to categorizes industries." Id. at 1355 n.6. Facilities may be
categorized into major groups (2-digit SIC Code), industry groups (3-digit SIC
Code), or industry codes (4-digit SIC Code), depending on the level of detail
which is determined to be appropriate. Id. (citing ExEc. OFFIcE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLAMSSIFICATION

MANUAL 12 (1987)).
92. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1359. EPA's final rule defined "fugitive
emissions" as "those emissions from a stationary source that could not reasonably
pass through a stack, chimney, vent or other functionally equivalent opening." National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories:
General Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. at 12,433. NMA contended that EPA could not
include fugitive emissions of hazardous air pollutants in a major source determination without first conducting a separate rulemaking pursuant to section 3020). See
National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1359.
93. See id. at 1354. The court referred collectively to CMA and API as CMA
for purposes of this issue. See id. Clearly, a primary reason for the petitioners'
desire for state and local controls to be included in EPA's "potential to emit" determination was to allow sources to more easily avoid the stricter permit and regulatory requirements that accompany a major source classification. See id. at 1353
(stating that "[u]nder the Act, 'major sources' of hazardous air pollutants are potentially subject to stricter regulatory control than are 'area sources'). For a discussion of the more stringent regulations for major sources as compared to area
sources under the CAA, see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
94. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1361 (holding "all emissions are to be
counted in determining whether a source is major").
95. See id. (stating EPA "may require the inclusion of fugitive emissions in a
site's aggregate emissions").
96. See id. at 1363. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that EPA had failed to explain
how its refusal to consider limitations other than those that are federally enforcea-
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D.C. Circuit granted CMA's petition for review of EPA's regulation
requiring that limitations on a site's potential to emit be federally
97
enforceable.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In National Mining, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia considered three claims set forth by the petition for review of EPA's regulations implementing the 1990 Amendments. 98 While the D.C. Circuit denied review of EPA's rules
requiring the aggregation of a source's HAPs 99 and the inclusion of
fugitive emissions in a major source determination, 10 0 the court
granted review of EPA's definition of "potential to emit."10 1
A. Aggregation
The D.C. Circuit first considered whether EPA had improperly
required the aggregation of emissions from all facilities on a contiguous plant site under common control in a major source determination.'0 2 Looking to the statutory language at issue, the D.C.
Circuit found that "EPA's reading of the provision is not [only] consistent with the provision; it is nearly compelled by the statutory
ble comported with the statute's directive to "consider controls" when such refusal
resulted in the exclusion of state or local controls that were unquestionably effective. See id.
97. See id. at 1365. The D.C. Circuit's reasoning in National Miningultimately
formed the basis for the court's decision, two months later, to vacate EPA's definition of "potential to emit" in Chemical For further discussion of the Chemical decision, see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
98. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1354. General Electric and NMA asserted
the "aggregation" issue, NMA asserted the "fugitive emissions" issue, and CMA and
API asserted the "potential to emit" issue. See id.
99. For a discussion of the "aggregation" issue, see infta notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of the "fugitive emissions issue," see infra notes 108-12
and accompanying text.
101. See NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1365. For a discussion of the "potential to
emit" issue, see infra notes 113-33 and accompanying text.
102. See id. at 1354. General Electric argued that EPA may only aggregate
emissions from different facilities on a contiguous plant site under common control when the facilities belong to the same source category. See id. at 1355. Section
112 defines a "category" of sources as "a group of sources having some common
features suggesting that they should be regulated in the same way and on the same
schedule." Id. at 1355 n.5 (quoting Initial List of Categories of Sources under Section 112(c) (1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,576,
31,578 (1992)). For example, sources considered to be in the same category include "hazardous waste incineration" and "sewage sludge incineration." See id. (citing Initial List of Categories of Sources under Section 112(c) (1) of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. at 31,591).
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language."10 3 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit similarly rejected General Electric's "anomalous results" argument. 1°4 Rather, the D.C.
Circuit found that General Electric's argument reflected a misreading of section 112, and stated that "[i]f a small emissions unit is a
'major source' because it is located at a plant that [exceeds the major source thresholds], it is subject to all the regulatory requirements imposed on major sources, including those of section 112(d)
and section 112(g)." 10 5
The court also declared that NMA's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) argument against the aggregation of emissions at
contiguous facilities under common control "warrant[ed] little discussion."106 Rejecting NMA's position, the D.C. Circuit found to be
reasonable EPA's explanation that it defined "major source" without reference to (1) SIC codes in section 112; (2) the seven different objectives of that section; and (3) other provisions of the CAA
07
which also included references to the term "major source."
103. Id. at 1356. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that section 112(a)(1) requires
only three conditions for a stationary source to be considered a "major source":
sources within the group must be "located within a contiguous area" ;(2)
they must be "under common control" ; and (3) in the aggregate, they
must emit or, considering controls, have the potential to emit 10 or more
tons per year of a single hazardous air pollutant or 25 or more tons per
year of any combination of hazardous air pollutants.
Id. (quoting in part CAA § 112(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a) (1)) (1994)). The court
pointed out that this provision "says nothing about combining emissions only from
sources within the same source categories ..

. ."

Id. at 1356.

104. See id. at 1356-57. General Electric suggested that under CAA section
2(g), "an operator of a small emissions unit at a large facility might have to
install MACT in order to modify or reconstruct the unit, even though the unit
would not be subject to a MACT standard under § 112(d), [42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)]."
Id. at 1357.
105. Id. at 1357. The D.C. Circuit also dismissed General Electric's argument
that EPA's implementation of CAA section 112(a) (1) was procedurally flawed. See
id. Indeed, the court found that "[e]ven if General Electric were correct about
EPA's alleged procedural defects, the company has not shown why these supposed
mistakes were so serious that, had they not been made, there is a 'substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed.'" Id. at 1358 (quoting
CAA § 107(d) (8), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (8)).
106. NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1358. NMA claimed that because EPA used a
SIC approach to define "major source" for ozone nonattaiment areas and the Title
V permitting program, EPA should also use the same method for section 112. See
id.; see also CAA § 182(c)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)-(e) (relating to major sources in
ozone nonattainment areas); CAA § 501(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2) (relating to major
sources in Title V permit program).
107. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1358; see also Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("EPA has latitude to adopt definitions of...
'source' that are different... from those [used in other programs]."); cf. Mobil Oil
Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("This court has previously upheld the agency's decision to employ different definitions of the term 'facility' in
construing different portions of RCRA.").
11
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Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that EPA properly required the
aggregation of all emissions within a contiguous plant site under
common control in a "major source" determination under section
112.
B.

Fugitive Emissions

In National Mining, the D.C. Circuit also considered whether
EPA had properly included fugitive emissions in a major source determination without first conducting a separate rulemaking. 0 8 According to NMA, Alabama Power required the Administrator under
CAA section 302 (j) to promulgate a separate regulation in order to
include fugitive emissions in determining whether a source is a
"major source." 1°9 The D.C. Circuit distinguished Alabama Power
from the present case, however, due to several differences between
section 3020) and section 112(a)(1).1 ° In addition, the court
The court also disposed of NMA's argument that EPA's definition of "major
source" is inconsistent with the legislative history of the 1990 amendments. See
National Mining,59 F.3d at 1358-59. NMA based this position on an excerpt from
the House Report discussing the "major source" definitional language added to
CAA section 182(a):
The definition of "major source" [in the ozone nonattainment area] and
elsewhere in the bill uses the term "group of sources located within a contiguous area and under common control." The Committee understands
this to mean a group of sources with a common industrial grouping, i.e.,
the same two-digit SIC code.
Id. at 1359 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-490, at 236-37 (1990)). The D.C. Circuit
found that as a general matter, however, the legislative history supports EPA's interpretation. See id.
108. See NationalMining 59 F.3d at 1359. EPA defined "fugitive emissions" in
its final rule as "those emissions from a stationary source that could not reasonably
pass through a stack, chimney, vent or other functionally equivalent opening." Id.
at 1359 (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Categories: General Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408, 12,433 (1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 63.2)). The court stated that "[iun contrast to fugitive emissions, emissions emanating from a stack, chimney or vent are often called 'point
source' emissions." Id. at 1359 n.16 (citing Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 368).
109. Id. at 1360. In relevant part, CAA section 302 0 ) provides that:
[elxcept as otherwise expressly provided, a "major stationary source" or
"major emitting facility" is any stationary source of air pollutants that "directly emits, or has the potential to emit" at least 100 tons per year of any
air pollutant, including "any major ... source of fugitive emissions . .. as
deamined by rule by the Administrator."
Id. (quoting CAA § 3020), 42 U.S.C. § 76020)) (emphasis added).
In Alabama Power, the court held that EPA had improperly included fugitive
emissions within section 169(1) of its "significant deterioration in air quality program" without first conducting rulemaking procedures as required by CAA section
302(j). See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 368-70.
110. See NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1360-61. The D.C. Circuit first concluded
that "one cannot say that section 302(j) supplies 'quantitative terms' for section
112(a)(1)'s definition of 'major source,' as it did for section 169(1), one of the
provisions at issue in Alabama Power." Id. at 1361. Second, the court stated that

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

23

542

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 6

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JoURNAL

[Vol. VIII: p. 519

found that the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments further
illustrated the differences between the two provisions."' Therefore, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA permissibly included fugitive
emissions in major source determinations without first making a
12
separate rule to that effect.
C.

Potential to Emit

Finally, the D.C. Circuit began its consideration of EPA's definition of "potential to emit" by pointing out that the phrase had
been at the center of more than a "decade of skirmishing between
[EPA] and affected companies."' 1 3 Employing the test for statutory
interpretation established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Councilj,"4 the D.C. Circuit then considered EPA's argument
that because Congress had not expressly defined the term "controls" under CAA section 112, EPA was free to interpret the term as
unlike section 3020), which distinguishes between "direct" air pollutants and fugitive emissions, section 112(a) (1) does not consider fugitive emissions as a separate
category of emissions. See id. Finally, Tide V of the CAA draws an express distinction between the two sections when it defines "major source" for permitting purposes as "either a 'major source as defined in section 7412 [§ 112]' or a 'major
stationary source as defined in section 7602 [§ 302].'" Id. (quoting CAA § 501(2),
42 U.S.C. § 7661(2)) (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 1361. The D.C. Circuit looked to the Senate committee report,
stating that the definition of "major source" in section 112 "will only apply in the
context of this section and should not be confused with other meanings of the
term 'major source'...." Id. at 1361 (citing S. REP. No. 101-228, at 150-51 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 3385, 3535-36).
112. See id. at 1361. But cf. Ogden Pojects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Co., 911
F. Supp. 863, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that fugitive emissions may not be
counted to determine whether landfills are major sources for Part D permitting
purposes).
113. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1363. For a further discussion of the protracted history of litigation between EPA and affected industries over the definition of the phrase "potential to emit," see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying
text.
114. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362. In Chevron, the United States
Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating a governmental agency's
interpretation of a statute. See Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880
F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating "[i]f the court, having studied the statutory
text, structure and history, is left with the unmistakable conclusion that Congress
had an intention on the precise question at issue, 'that intention is the law and
must be given effect.'") (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
The first part of the Chevron test requires the court to determine whether
Congress has spoken to the question at issue. See id. at 842. The Supreme Court
explained that "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. Under the second part of Chevron, if the
court finds that the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
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including only those emission-reducing controls that were "federally enforceable."1 15
Applying the first step of the Chevron test, the D.C. Circuit
looked to the statutory language directing EPA to "consider controls" in determining a source's potential to emit pollutants and
concluded that Congress "conspicuously did not limit controls to
those that are federally enforceable."' 16 The D.C. Circuit also established that regardless of the statute's ambiguity with respect to
the term "controls," Congress intended EPA to consider only those
controls that are "effective."17
Under the second part of the Chevron test, the D.C. Circuit
then considered the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments to
determine whether EPA had permissibly refused to consider state
and local controls on grounds other than their lack of effectiveness. 118 EPA argued that the rejection of an earlier version of the
1990 Amendments containing a broad version of the term "controls" illustrated Congress's support for EPA's restrictive definition
of emission controls." 9 However, the D.C. Circuit dismissed this
argument, stating that Congress's disapproval of the Senate bill in
favor of a more restrictive version did "not necessarily suggest that it
implicitly delegated to EPA authority to limit the class of... restraints... to those that are 'federally enforceable."'1 20
115. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362.
116. Id. at 1363. The court noted that the potential for broad interpretations
of the term, such as one allowing the term "controls" to refer to non-governmental
operational restrictions that a source might voluntarily adopt, supports the conclusion that the term is not clear on its face. See id. at 1362.
117. See id. (stating EPA would dearly be justified in excluding those controls
that are "only chimeras and do not really restrain an operator from emitting pollution."). The EPA attempted to justify its position by identifying several state and
local regulatory approaches that may qualify as effective "federally enforceable"
controls under its rule. See id. at 1363. For a full discussion of these regulatory
approaches, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
A few examples of these "federally enforceable" controls are as follows: (1)
inclusion of the state or local regulation within a SIP; (2) source-specific exclusionary rules; and (3) permit requirements available within a FESOPP. See Memorandum from EPA on Options for Limiting the Potential to Emit (PTE) of a
Stationary Source Under Section 112 and Tide V of the Clean Air Act, at 2-4 (Jan.
25, 1995). The D.C. Circuit noted, however, that each of the regulatory methods
which EPA identified required inclusion within a SIP, a decision over which EPA
had exclusive control. See National Mining,59 F.3d at 1363. Thus, the court found
that "EPA has proposed conditions for achieving 'federal enforceability' that go
beyond the mere effectiveness of [a] particular constraint as a practical matter."
Id.
118. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1364.
119. See id. (citing S. 1630, 101st Cong. (1989) (describing controls as "installed and operating")).
120. Id.
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The D.C. Circuit similarly rejected EPA's contention that Congress had implicitly ratified EPA's past treatment of non-federally
enforceable controls when it enacted the 1990 Amendments. 12 1 In
evaluating this argument, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the
1989 EPA regulations requiring federal enforceability had been the
subject of a legal challenge when Congress promulgated the 1990
Amendments.' 2 2 Therefore, in light of this challenge to federal enforceability, the D.C. Circuit found that "Congress cannot be said to
have ratified EPA's position [in the 1990 Amendments] by introducing the phrase 'considering controls' without an explicit 'fed23
eral enforceability' limitation."
The D.C. Circuit also found unpersuasive EPA's policy arguments supporting the federal enforceability requirement on potential to emit reductions. 124 EPA asserted that in the absence of the
federal enforceability requirement, it would be subject to the administrative burden of evaluating the effectiveness of all applicable
state and local controls in reducing a source's potential to emit pollutants.125 While recognizing the legitimacy of administrative concerns, 126 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless opined that EPA's "strained
interpretation of the statute [was] based on what appear[ed] to be
only its unwillingness to evaluate any state or local controls that
[were] not federalized." 127 Thus, the D.C. Circuit rejected EPA's
first policy argument.
The D.C. Circuit also disposed of EPA's second policy argument in support of its federal enforceability requirement. 28 EPA
argued that limiting the means of reducing a source's potential to
emit pollutants to federally enforceable controls furthered one of
Congress's primary goals in amending the CAA in 1990, namely, to
create a "national uniformity" among the states with respect to air
pollution regulations. 2 9 The D.C. Circuit concluded that this goal
121. See id. at 1364.
122. See id. For a discussion of the proposed 1989 EPA regulations requiring
federal enforceability, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
123. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1364.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. The court stated that "[a]dministrative problems... can under
certain circumstances inform an agency's construction of imprecise statutory language." Id. (citing Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
127. Id. at 1364.
128. See National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1365.
129. See id. at 1364-65. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-490, at 232 (1990) (finding
"[tihe states' approaches to regulation varied widely... creating 'a patchwork of
differing standards'")).
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could be achieved without accepting EPA's restrictive interpretation of congressional intent. 3 0 Rather, the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the 1990 Amendments already effectively created a national
standard by requiring the classification of major and area sources
13
which are subject to federal statutory compliance regulations.
The D.C. Circuit further concluded that the legislature's desire for
national uniformity among state air pollution regulations " [ b] y no
means suggest[ed] that Congress necessarily intended for state
emissions controls to be disregarded in determining whether a
source is classified as 'major' or 'area' under that national standard." 3 2 Granting CMA's petition for review of the EPA order, the
D.C. Circuit found that EPA exceeded its authority by only considering federally enforceable emission controls in determining a
33
source's potential to emit pollutants.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

While the conclusions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia were well-reasoned, the court's analysis
would have benefitted from additional support. The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments further supports the D.C. Circuit's
rejection of General Electric's "source category" challenge to EPA's
aggregation requirement. 3 4 CAA section 307(d) (7) (B) provides
an alternative basis for supporting EPA's inclusion of fugitive emissions in a major source determination. 3 5 Finally, both prior judicial treatment of the term "potential to emit" and the rules of
statutory construction support the D.C. Circuit's inclusion of state

and local controls in determining a source's potential to emit
36
pollutants.
130. See id. at 1365.

131. See id.; see also CAA § 112(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)-(d) (1990) (providing requirements for listings of source categories and for emission standards pertaining to each category or subcategory of major sources and area sources). For a
further discussion of major sources, area sources, and their corresponding compliance measures, see supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
132. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1365.
133. See id. The D.C. Circuit subsequently denied EPA's motion for rehearing
en banc on the "potential to emit" issue on September 21, 1995. See id. at 1351;
Rawicz, supra note 56, at 558-59.
134. For a critical analysis of the "aggregation" issue, see infra notes 137-38
and accompanying text.

135. For a critical analysis of the "fugitive emissions" issue, see infra notes 13941 and accompanying text.

136. For a critical analysis of the "potential to emit" issue, see infra notes 14252 and accompanying text.
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A. Aggregation
Although the D.C. Circuit properly rejected General Electric's
"source category" challenge to the aggregation requirement based
on the statutory language of section 112, the legislative history of
the 1990 Amendments also supports this conclusion.13 7 Senator
Durenberger, one of the managers of the 1990 Amendments, confirmed that EPA's aggregation approach comported with Congress's intent by stating that "if the total emissions from the entire
site combined meet or exceed the [major source thresholds] then the
entire site is a major source and subject to regulation." 8s Thus, the
legislative history of the 1990 Amendments also supports the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that EPA permissibly required the aggregation
of all emissions at a contiguous site under common control.
B.

Fugitive Emissions

While the D.C. Circuit's reasoning on this issue is also persuasive, there is an alternative ground for disposing of NMA's claim
which the court appears to have overlooked. The CAA requires
parties to submit comments during the proposed rule's designated
comment period so that EPA may address these concerns in its final
rule.' 3 9 The CAA further provides that "[o]nly an objection to a
137. For example, the House Report states:
[ffor purposes of the definition [of "major source"], all emissions of
listed pollutants are counted from a group of sources within a plant
boundary (contiguous property under common ownership). This is to
assure that emissions from the facility as a whole are adequately
controlled.
H.L REP. No. 101-490, at 324 (1990). Both the Senate and House Reports also
support EPA's view that MACT standards can be applied individually to contiguous
sources within a major source. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 168 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3553 (citing example of facility with HAP emissions from
.stack and non-point sources" and specifying that "MACT will be determined for
each type of emissions point and not for the facility as a whole"); see also H.R REP.
No. 101-490, at 329 ("The MACT provision in the bill gives the Administrator discretion in categorizing and subcategorizing facilities for regulation under subsection (d).").
138. 136 CONc. REc. S16,920 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990), reprinted in 1 CRS,
LEGIsLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE

CLEAN At ACr

AMENDMrENTS OF

1990, at 731, 865

(statement of Sen. Durenberger) (emphasis added). Senator Durenberger also
confirmed that MACT standards should apply to all sources of hazardous air pollutants within a major source, regardless of whether each source alone would be
"major." See id. Finally, Senator Durenberger noted that the "opposite interpretation," which would exempt from MACT requirements those facilities at a "major"
plant site that are not themselves "major," "is contrary to our intent and not a
permissible interpretation." Id. at 865.
139. See CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (6) (A) (1994) (providing that final
rule shall be accompanied by statement explaining reasons for changes in final
rule from proposed rule); see also id. § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (6) (B) (providing
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/6
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rule or procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment... may be raised during judicial
review."' 4° However, no party submitted comments on the proposed fugitive emissions rule with respect to section 3020), which
NMA questioned in NationalMining.14 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
could have dismissed NMA's challenge on this issue based on
NMA's failure to raise any objections to the proposed fugitive emissions rule during the comment period.
C.

Potential to Emit

The D.C. Circuit properly interpreted the phrase "potential to
emit" to include not only federally enforceable controls, but also
those that are enforceable under state and local law.' 42 The federal
courts which have addressed the phrase have consistently ruled in
favor of broadly construing the acceptable means of reducing a
source's "potential to emit" pollutants. 143 For example, in Alabama
Power, the D.C. Circuit itself first considered EPA's "potential to
emit" regulation shortly after its promulgation. 144 There, the D.C.
Circuit rejected EPA's strict definition of the phrase, which at that
that final rule shall be accompanied by statement responding to comments "submitted in written or oral form during the comment period.") (emphasis added).
140. CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (7) (B) (emphasis added). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(dismissing petitions for review for failure to comment); Specialty Equip. Mkt.
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 720 F.2d 124, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same).
141. See Brief for Respondent at 60, National Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1006).
142. See NationalMining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In
its rule implementing the amendments, however, EPA defined these emission-reducing controls as including only those that were "federally enforceable." National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories:
General Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,408, 12,434 (1994). For a full discussion of
section 112 under the 1990 Amendments, see supranotes 33-46 and accompanying
text. For a full discussion of the "federal enforceability" requirement, see supra
notes 54-56.
143. See Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, No. 96-1224, 1996 WL
393118 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 1996) (granting Petitioners' motion for summary vacatur of federal enforceability requirement challenged in National Mining); Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 89-1514 to 89-1516, 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15,
1995) (vacating federal enforceability requirement challenged in National Mining)); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting strict
EPA limitations on emission reducing controls); Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill, 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (calculating defendant source's
potential to emit pollutants based on reasoning in National Mining).
144. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 323. For a full discussion of the Alabama
Power decision, see supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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time excluded pollution control equipment such as scrubbers and
145
filters from a source's emission determination.
In addition, the decision of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Ogden provides strong support for the D.C. Circuit's reasoning. In Ogden, after initially finding that the defendant's operation of a landfill constituted a
violation of the CAA's major source permit requirement, the district court reversed its earlier decision based on the D.C. Circuit's
use of state and local emission controls in National Mining to determine a source's "potential to emit."14 Subsequent to the Ogden decision, the D.C. Circuit has remained consistent in holding that
be included in a source's
state and local emission controls should
"potential to emit" determination. 147
The rules of statutory construction as outlined in the United
States Supreme Court's Chevron decision also support the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "potential to emit" as including
state and local controls.'48 Looking to the express language of the
statute as directed by the first part of the Chevron test, Congress
stated that a "major source" is "any stationary source.., that emits or
has the potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons
per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year
or more of any combination of hazardous air pollutants." 149 Therefore, because the express language is not clear regarding the type
of controls acceptable under the CAA, the second part of the Chevron test dictates that the D.C. Circuit's analysis move beyond the
language of the statute to determine whether EPA's construction is
reasonable. 150
145. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 355. According to the court, EPA's definition of "potential to emit" comported with neither the language of the statute nor
the intent and purpose of Congress in promulgating the legislation. See id.
146. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 863. For a full discussion of the Ogden decision, see supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Chemical, 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 89-1514 to
89-1516) (vacating EPA's "potential to emit definition" based on National Mining
decision); Clean Air ImplementationProject 1996 WL 393118, at * (granting Petitioners' motion for summary vacatur of federal enforceability requirement challenged
in National Mining).
148. For a discussion of the Chevron rules of statutory interpretation, see supra
note 114.
149. CAA § 112(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
150. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that if statute is silent or ambiguous on specific issue,
question for court is whether agency's answer is based on permissible construction
of statute). It should be noted, however, that within the major source definition,
Congress includes no language of limitation pertaining to the term "controls." See
id.
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Furthermore, the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments
supports the D.C. Circuit's broad interpretation of the types of
"controls" acceptable under the Act. The Senate report states that
"[t] he determination as to whether a source is a major source... is
based on the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from the source
after application of installed controls and reflecting the actual operating
conditions of the particularsource."15 1 Thus, the Senate report suggests
that emission determinations should include not only those controls which have been effectively implemented, but also a flexible
evaluation of the operating conditions of a particular source. Further, the House report similarly provides that "[t]he determination
as to whether a source is a 'major source' [should be] based on the
emissions of hazardous air pollutants from the source after application of installed controls."152 Thus, the House report also illustrates
Congress's intent to allow a broader range of controls than EPA's
definition of the phrase would have permitted. Therefore, both
precedent and the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments support the D.C. Circuit's broader interpretation of the phrase "potential to emit" as including federal, state and local controls.
VI.

IMPACT

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in NationalMining will have a substantial impact
on both future court decisions and American industry. 155 In addition to creating precedent which is binding on virtually every federal court, 5 4 the D.C. Circuit also established a means for sources
of pollution to avoid the CAA's extensive and complex regulatory
requirements which accompany a major source classification. 1 55
Most importantly, the D.C. Circuit's holding provides a much
151. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 151, 1990 U.S.C.CAN. at 3536 (emphasis
added).
152. H.R REP. No. 101-490, at 325 (emphasis added).
153. While the D.C. Circuit did not actually vacate EPA's "potential to emit"
regulation until two months later in Chemica4 the court relied entirely on its reasoning in NationalMining tojustify the decision to vacate EPA's rulemaking. Chemical, Nos. 89-1514 to 1516, 1995 WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1995) (unpublished
disposition). For a further discussion of National Mining's impact on the Chemical
case, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
154. NationalMining will be binding on virtually every federal court, because
CAA section 307(b) (1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. See CAA § 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
For a further discussion of the CAA's exclusivity provision, see infra note 156 and
accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the means by which sources of pollution may avoid
major source classification, see infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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needed resolution to the "potential to emit" debate and creates a
degree of predictability for industry implementation of pollution
control mechanisms.
The decision in National Mining to allow consideration of state
and local emission-reducing controls in determining a source's potential to emit will serve as binding precedent within the D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction. Moreover, with the exception of the United
States Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit's ruling will also have a
binding effect on every other federal court, because the CAA extends exclusive jurisdiction for challenges of EPA's regulatory authority under section 112 to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 156 Thus, absent a grant of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court, any judicial modification of
EPA's now vacated "potential to emit" regulation will necessarily
have to come from the D.C. Circuit.
Perhaps the best evidence of National Mining's impact on future court decisions is found in Ogden.157 In that case, after originally finding that the defendant's landfill violated the CAA's
emission standards, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania actually reversed itself on a motion for reconsideration in light of NationalMining and Chemical 15 8 Based on
these decisions, the Ogden court held on reconsideration that the
defendant's landfill did not violate the CAA, because its potential to
emit, when calculated including state and local controls, did not
159
rise to the level of a major source.

156. See CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (providing that "[a] petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating ... any emission
standard or requirement under section 7412 of this tide ... may be filed only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.").
157. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. 863, 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996). For a full discussion of
the Ogden decision, see supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
158. See Ogden, 911 F. Supp. at 865. The court explained that it was unaware
of the D.C. Circuit's decision to vacate EPA's "potential to emit" definition when it
handed down its first ruling. See id.
159. See id. In addition to the support that National Mining has begun to receive from the federal courts, a number of state and local air pollution control
agencies have also endorsed the decision. See Air Pollution: State, Local Regulatory
Agencies Urge EPA Not to Appeal FederalEnforceability Case, DAmY ENV'T REP., (BNA),
Nov. 2, 1995, at A13 [hereinafter Air Pollution]. For example, the presidents of
both the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators (STAPPA)
and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials (ALAPCO) urged EPA
not to appeal the National Mining decision after the D.C. Circuit denied EPA's
petition for review. See id. Rather, STAPPA and ALAPCO "asked EPA to work with
them 'to implement the court order in a manner that [could] address [their] collective concerns ....

'"

Id.
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Interestingly, the specter of "federal enforceability" may still
loom at the state level. As part of its criteria for SIP approval, EPA
required that each state include a "federal enforceability" prerequisite for all regulations included in its implementation plan. 16° As
the D.C. Circuit explained, "[o]nce included within the SIP, a state
control becomes enforceable not only by the state which is its primazy regulating authority, but also by the Administrator. .. and, in
certain settings, by private citizens, who can bring suit for noncompliance with federal pollution control programs under § 304
"161

In the wake of NationalMining, however, these state-imposed
federal enforceability requirements may be subject to similar judicial challenges. Though not binding on state courts in evaluating
their own legislation, the D.C. Circuit's vacatur of EPA's federal enforceability requirement will certainly carry great persuasive value.
If "EPA [could] not explain [ ] why it is essential that a [federally
enforceable] control be included within a SIP," then it is unlikely
that EPA will be successful in doing so on the state level. 162 Moreover, the fact that few states actually have programs which EPA has
approved for consideration in a potential to emit determination
also reduces the likelihood of a lingering federal enforceability
requirement. 163
The National Mining decision will have a substantial impact on
American industry as well. 164 The D.C. Circuit's decision to allow
160. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 54 Fed. Reg.
27,274, 27,281-82 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52); see also National
Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing "federal
enforceability" as requirement for SIP approval).
161. NationalMining, 59 F.3d at 1363. For a further discussion of the Administrator's power to bring suit, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the citizen suit provision under the CAA, see supra note 56
and accompanying text.
162. National Mining, 59 F.3d at 1364.
163. See Final Joint Brief of Petitioners Chemical Manufacturers Association
and American Petroleum Institute at 13, National Mining (No. 95-1006) (stating
"EPA pointed out that some 'sources that would qualify as area sources exempt
from the HON [the MACT standard for the chemical industry] ...do not have the
ability to demonstrate to EPA that their potential to emit is below major source
levels.'" (quoting National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other Processes Subject to the Negotiated
Regulation for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 53,359 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63))).
164. In fact, the prominence and diversity of the petitioners themselves indicates to some extent the importance of NationalMining to American industry. For
a description of the petitioners in NationalMining, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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effective state and local emission controls in a "potential to emit"
determination will have the greatest impact on those facilities currently classified as "major sources." Because a major source classification depends on the amount of pollution a source "emits or has
the potential to emit," sources previously classified as major sources
may now take advantage of state and local controls to reduce their

"potential to emit" below the major source thresholds.1 65
The consequences of such a reduction are considerable. A major source that can effectively reduce its "potential to emit" below
the major source thresholds may then avoid the extensive and complex regulatory requirements that would otherwise apply to that
source. 16 Such a facility would then have to comply only with the
CAA's area source regulations, which are exceedingly less stringent
than their major source counterparts.167
NationalMining will also affect new major sources constructed
after the D.C. Circuit's decision. 168 New major sources may now
avoid the strict Tide V major source construction permits that the
CAA required. 169 In addition, the CAA emission standards for new
major sources will no longer affect those sources now able to
achieve a "potential to emit" below major source levels using state
and local emission controls.1 7 0 Thus, the NationalMining decision
represents a major victory for American industry because it essentially relieves those sources that successfully reduce their potential
165. For a discussion of the CAA's definition of a "major source," see text
accompanying note 37 and accompanying text.
166. See; e.g., Ogden, 911 F. Supp. 863, 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing defendant to reduce potential to emit through state control to avoid liability under CAA
for failure to obtain major source permit). A major source that has successfully
reduced its "potential to emit" using state and local controls would traditionally
avoid the major source regulations by petitioning for review of its classification by
the administrator. See CAA § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994) (providing for
judicial review of action by Administrator). Alternatively, such a source may simply
choose to not comply with the "inapplicable" major source regulations, and challenge its classification in the event that EPA files suit. A source must do so carefully, however, because the CAA provides for severe penalties for non-compliance.
See CAA § 502(c) (5) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(c) (5) (E) (providing for penalty of not
less than $10,000 per day for each violation of Title V permit requirement).
167. For a discussion of the strict major source regulations as compared to
the less stringent area source regulations under the CAA, see supra notes 40-47 and
accompanying text.
168. The CAA defines new sources as any "stationary source the construction
or reconstruction of which is commenced after the Administrator first proposes
regulations under this section establishing an emission standard applicable to such
source." CAA § 112(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(4).
169. For a discussion of the permit application requirements under the CAA,
see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the strict emission standards for new major sources,
see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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to emit using state and local controls of the financial and administrative burdens associated with major source compliance.
While it will have a significant impact on future court decisions
and American industry, the D.C. Circuit's decision does not create
any additional risk to public health. NationalMiningrelieves certain
sources of pollution from the CAA's strict compliance standards
without sacrificing Congress's goal of preserving the nation's clean
air. 171 The decision does not alter the major source emission
thresholds themselves, however, but rather broadens the category
of controls which may be considered in reducing a source's potential to emit with respect to those thresholds. 17 The effect of National Mining is to allow a source to avoid these controls if it has
incorporated effective federal, state or local controls which keep the
source from emitting, actually or potentially, an amount of pollutants which exceeds the major source thresholds. Truly, as the D.C.
Circuit recognized in National Mining,"the environment shouldn't
care whether [federal, state or local controls are] responsible for
reducing the emissions" which threaten to destroy it-173
Robert T. Grolnick
171. See National Mining, 59 F.3d 1351, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also S. REP.
No. 101-228, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3391 (stating that
"[t] he goal of the Clean Air Act is to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources").
172. For example, after National Mining, a source which emits or has the potential to emit 30 tons per year of a particular HAP (thereby exceeding the major
source thresholds) will still be subject to the CAA's major source compliance regulations. See genera/ly CAA § 112(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (identifying major
source thresholds as "ten tons per year or more of any hazardous pollutant or 25
tons per year of any combination of hazardous pollutants.").
173. Air Pollution, supra note 159, at A14.
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